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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Never before, in all history, has civilization been 
exposed to such an abundance of new products, from do-nothing 
gadgets and gimmicks, on the one hand, to highly technical and 
complicated computers on the other. Daily the TV, radio, news-
papers and magazines keep persons ever aware of the steadily in-
creasing number and complexity of these new and most "necessary't 
discoveries of mankind. 
In addition to this bombardment of things is the even 
greater flood of ideas and theories which accompany them as well 
as those which form the foundations of the political, theological 
and scientific issues of this time. Often contradictory, these 
concepts sometimes seem to be in constant battle for their ac-
ceptance by individual persons. 
How does the inventor put together his new product and 
make it work? How does the scientist discover new laws of natur~ 
the historian extract the major factors of a particular war or 
the theologian dave lop his concept 0 f man t s salvation? :Moreover, 
how do persons decide which product to buy, for whom to vote or 
which faith to embrace, to name just a few of the countless de-
cisions faced daily? 
Let us consider, for example, the inventor. He must 
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first have some understanding of what he is trying to do, and 
how his materials might work together to produce his desired 
effect. He must rely on facts he already knows and if necessary 
seek to learn some things he does not yet know. On the basis of 
these facts he forms a calculated guess, or theory, and accord-
ing to this theory and the principles he sees to be involved, he 
proceeds to construct his product. If, however, his facts are 
inaccurate and his theories and principles inappropriate, his 
finished product will be ineffective. 
The inventor, therefore, and in like manner also the 
scientist, theologian, philosopher and historian, find themselves 
of necessity concerned with not only the acquisition of new know-
ledge but also the verification of the truths upon which this new 
knowledge is based. The proper acquisition of knowledge and the 
verification of those inherent truths behind all "ne,,1t concepts, 
whether basic to the construction and use of material objects or 
in themselves purely conceptual, become therefore most crucial. 
For many years, persons realizing this have concerned themselves 
with the study of knowledge itself and ways in which it is ac-
quired. This acquisition and development of knowledge is more 
popularly known as reasoning. 
Reasoning, or as it is also often called, thinking or 
inference, has been described as fl ••• the process by which new 
facts are attained from concepts and relationships already appre-
hended. (It) represents the extension of knowledge without the 
mediation of perception."l Uncounted volumes have been written 
through the centuries in an attempt to analyze and clarify this 
apparently simple but basically complex process. It seems only 
appropriate therefore to turn briefly at this time to some dis-
cuesion of reasoning itself. 
To trace this process of reasoning to its logical 
foundations, one must go back all the way to some of the philo-
sopher's fundamental laws or first principles -- in other words, 
those laws, the truths of which in their very stating, are so ap-
parent, they are felt to be universally acceptable without the 
need for other verification. Those here applicable are the 
Principle of Causality and the Uniformity of Nature. 
The first of these two, the Principle of Causality is 
itself derived from other of these fundamental laws, namely the 
Principle of Identity, the Principle of Contradiction and the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason. Stated very simply, a thing 
either is, or is not, but if it is, there must be sufficient 
reason for it to be. Each individual effect, therefore, must 
have an adequate cause. Stated conversely, every cause must 
have an effect, this then becomes the Principle of Causality. 
But it is not enough to know that every cause must have 
an effect. If the foundations of reasoning ended here, all know-
ledge would be limited to historical recordings of single causes 
and their respective effects. Nothing could be known that had 
1. Harmon, Francis L., Principles of Psychology, The Bruce 
Publishing Co.: 1938-40, IV, page 370. 
not been directly experienced, and predictions of the future 
would be entirely impossible. 
The second fundamental law here applicable, the Uni-
formity of Nature, asserts that nature operates in ways that are 
universal. That is, whatever essentially causes a particular ef-
fect will, by virtue of the universality or uniformity of nature, 
essentially cause that same effeot whenever and wherever it ap-
pears. If, therefore, the eseence of a particular cauae-and-
affect relationship can be ascertained, it can be assumed, C~ 
predicted, to occur in like manner whenever these essential con-
ditions are met, and knowledge itself becomes extended It ••• 
without the mediation of perception." 
Philosophers have traditionally differentiated between 
twomethods, or approaches, to this process of reasoning -- de-
duotion and induction. Deduotion occurs when thinking proceeds 
from a general, universal rule to a specifio instance falling 
under that rule. "It proceeds from the universal to the parti-
culs.r, from the simple to the complex, from the logical whole to 
the logical part, from the general l~lW to the individual case, 
from the oause to the effect. ltl It is concerned with the 
"formal truth" of the reasoning process, or the validity of the 
oonclusions drawn from the given premises. It is by nature, a 
synthetic prooess. 
1. Bi ttle, celestine N., O.M. Cap., Reali ty and ·che Mind: 
E.:Pistem...q;tQJU, The Bruoe PublishIng Co.: Milwaukee, 1936, 
page 7. 
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Induction, on the other hand, proceeds in the opposite 
direction. From particulars or a group of specific instances to 
a pattern or theory governing them, it It ••• is the legitimate 
inference of universal laws from individual cases. n1 It is con-
earned with the ";naterial truthlt of the reasoning process, that 
is, the validity or truth of the factual statements comprising 
the premises. It is analytic in nature. 
But the process of induction poses still another pro-
blem. To derive a general rule from an examination of speci:io 
instances would seem to requIre an exhaustive examination of all 
the possible instances that might be included under that general 
rule. Whenever this oan be done the resulting rule is said to be 
the produot of complete induotion. This rule, however, becomes 
an end produot~ There is no way for it to contribute to new 
knowledge, for everything subsun6d under it that is knowable 
must have alread.y become knowrl in the process of arriving at 
the law itself. 
It can readily be seen that such a oomplete examination 
is almost always impossible. In such a case, it becomes neces-
sery to establish so-called general rules on the basis of only 
partial examinations, or incomplete induction. The certitude of 
the complete induction becomes replaced with varying degrees of 
probability. Because of the uniformity of nature, discussed 
1. Bittle, Celestine N., O.F.M.Cap., The Science of Corre.t 
Thinkin~: Logic. Bruce Publishing Co.: MilwAukee: 195(), 
page 29 • 
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earlier, it has been found that, as that which becomes known 
from the examination of a group of particulars more closely taps 
their essence and nature, the probability of that particular law 
becomes increased. 
Incomplete induction, then, can easily be recognized 
as a most important approach to any form of organized and system-
ized, or "scientific" thinking. In fact, when certain require-
ments are fulfilled that show the conclusions to be legitimate, 
incomplete induction becomes "scientific method" or that process 
which "aima to discover what the facts really are."l 
Among these requirements for scientific method are the 
recognition of the universality of qualities and traits forming 
the essence and nature of each thing, as well as the following 
of these five distinct but interrelated steps: 
1. Observation of facts 
2. Formation of hypothesis 
3. Proof or verification of hypothesis 
.4. Explanation of the law 
5. Application of the law 
An inquiry, or question, is felt and formulated. On the basis of 
past knowledge and experienoe one or more hypothesis or guess as 
to the probable cause of the effect under observation is esta b-
lisned. The hypothesis is tested, usually through observing a 
1. Cohen, Morris R., and Nagel, Ernest, An Introduction to 
Logio and Sciel!tific Mathod. London: 1934. 
-7-
sample of the phenomenon under question and determination is 
made of which hypothesis is in best agreement with the facts. 
Again, as sampling and knowledge gets closer to nature and es-
senoe rather than attributes, the need for further evidence de-
oreases and its probability inoreases. The "law" so derived is 
stated and explained and is then ready for applioation to simi-
lar instanoes, for prediotion or additional verifioation. 
Soientifio method then, It ••• is oonoerned with verifioation • 
• • • (It) is the only way to inorease the general body of tested 
and verified truth and to eliminate arbitrary opinion."l 
Although induotion and deduotion have been desoribed 
as separate forms of reasoning, a oloser look at these steps of 
scientifio method reveals that they are both, in aotuality, but 
different aspeots of a single, combined prooess of formal logical 
reasoning or inferenoe. Onoe a general law is established by 
analysis, or induotion, it is useless and meaningless unless ap-
plied through synthesis, or deduotion. 
Logioians and other philosophers have not been alone 
in their ooncern for the process ot reasoning. From almost every 
field have oome urgent pleas to apply these techniques of reason-
ing and "soientifio method'" more conscientiously. From the field 
at education, J. Miles asks that students be trained to think 
and write with reason, that is, more than a mere reporting of 
tacts but not totally creative and unsubstantiated either. She 
1. Cohen and Nagel, Ibid. page 401 
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urges " ••• the making of statements based on interest and 
speculation and the supporting of them by adequate evidenoe pro 
and con. ,,1 
Gombrich, in the world of art, says, "All culture and 
all communioation depend on the interplay between expectation and 
observation, the waves of fulfillment, disappointment, right 
guess and wrong moves that make up our daily life.,,2 
In the domain of English, Brown says, ftAny collection 
of objects or events is susceptible of a large number of alter-
native categorizations -- exolusive, conjunctive, disjunctive, 
or relational. n3 "By experiment we discover expeotancies linking 
categories or variables.,,4 
Speaking from the standpoint of history, Teggert says: 
"Consoiously or unoonsciously, all faots observed and set down 
have relation to some notion, hypothesis or theory. • •• Aotual 
scientific inquiry begins, not with 'learning' what is already 
known of a partioular subjeot, not with the colleotion of materi-
als, but with the peroeption of some diffioulty in the ourrent 
1. Miles, Josephine, "The Use of Reason .. " Teachers Coll. Reo., 
1962, 63 (7), pages 540-547. 
2. Gombrich, E. H., Art and Illusion. Pantheon: New York, 
1960, page 60. 
3. Brown, R., Words and Things. Free Press: Glencoe, Ill., 
1958, page 13. 
4. Ibid. page 342 
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exp18natlon of phenomena. What ensues upon the perception of a 
difficulty is sustained cogitation."l 
The field of psychology has been just as acutely aware 
of the need to exercise proper reasoning in its deliberations, 
but it has gone even further. As "the science of the mind and 
mental aotivitles,n2 psychology has also been concerned with 
those mental processes or aotivities of oognition, or thinking, 
employed in reasoning itself. 
In attempting to investigate the nature of intelligenoe, 
Charles Spearman beoame one of the first psyohologists to dis-
ouss the cognitive prooess. Psyohology was at that time, he 
felt, a "chaos." To be a science, it must have a set of univer-
sal laws or principles. Drawing upon the results of the vast 
amount of individual research already done, Spearman developed 
the three principles of cognition which have sinoe come to be 
viewed as the classical psychological approach to this process 
of arriving at knowledge. 
All knowledge, infinite in range, according to Spear-
man, is based on individual persons' exp~rience whioh may be 
divided into two levels. The first, entitled sentienoe, is the 
the primary effeot of sensory stimUlation. It is purely a mental 
1. Teggert, F. G., Theory and Process of History. University 
of California Press: Berke1y; 1950, page 164. 
2. Morehead, Albert and Ray, editors, The New Amerioan Webster 
Handy College Diotionary. The New AmerIcan LIbrary, New 
York: 1961, page 367. 
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state involving an experience or reaction merely lived through 
or undergone. As soon as even the most basic form of intellect-
ualization is nade concerning any such experience, cognition ap-
pears and a percept, connoting far more than the mental state 
alone, is formed. These principles of cognition apply therefore 
to percepts. 
1. The Apprehension of Experien~ -- ttAny lived exper-
ience tends to evoke l.nn1l0diately a knowing of its characters and 
experiencer."l Functioning here as a unit are trl.!'se levels of 
awareness -- awareness of' the experience itself, awareness of 
knowing the 6xperierlce, and awareness of the self as the knower 
of the experience. Characters, that is, the experiences them-
selves, may be in the realm of affection (semsoryand non-sensory), 
cro.gnition (knowledge of) or conation (feeling about). This 
first principle, postulating the awareness of experience and the 
self as the experiencer, is primarily conoerned therefore with 
the states and acts of the experiencer. 
2. Eduction of Relations -- "The mentally presenting 
of any two or more characters (simple or complex) tends to evoke 
immediately a knowing of the relation between them.,,2 Once aware 
of two or more c.haracters, or experiences, the intellect connects 
elements together and becomes aware of the relation between them. 
1. Spearman, Charles, The Na.ture of tlIntelligence" and the 
Principles of Cognition. MacMillan & Co" London: 1923, 
page 48. 
2, Spearman, Ibid. page 63. 
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'l'hese experienoes may be ai thaI' actual (per'ceptual) or mer-ely 
presented (conoeptual). The relation, once generated, can then 
become a oharaoter in i taelf. 'rh!s secone principle adds all 
humanly co~izable relations ant can be thought of as that pro-
cess inherent in the discovery of rules. 
3. Eduction of Correlates -- "The presenting ot: any 
ctl&racter together v~ith any relation tends to evoke irr..nced!ately 
a knowing of the correlative character. HI Applicable only when 
the second principle is, this third leads to the san'le eventual 
result, differing only in which items are presented initie,lly 
and whioh arise in the process. Here, the awareness of a charac-
tel", or experience, and a relation leads to the a wareness of 
other charaoters having the same relation which need not, in 
themselves, be actually experienced. Only in this Viay can there 
be awareness of characters outside personal experience. This 
third prinoiple which adds all possible correlates to thl'i relA-
tions of the second principle is used whenever scientific laws, 
praotical methods, or maxirus are applied. 
Spearman's second principle, t~e evoking of a relation, 
or general rule, from two or more characters, or specific in-
stances, has often been considered inductive in character while 
his third principle, the applioation of a relation to othdr 
charaoters not directly experienced, has been said to be deduc-
tive. Spearman himself said that these second and third princi-
1. I bid. page 91. 
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ples, were parts of the same process just as the philosophers 
said of induction and deduction, and in a later work in colla-
boration with Jones he suggested a modern theory of cognition 
characterized by the word NOEGENESIS, ooined from the Greek 
words NOUS and GENESIS, and used to ft ••• designate creation 
of knowledge in its two chief forms, the eduction of relations 
and the eduction of correlates. ltl Noegenesis oombined with ab-
straction, they said, clearly defined the nature of ttGn or 
general intelligenoe. 
It is the hope of this present study to investigate 
experimentally one small segment of this process of oognition, 
or the acquirement of knowledge. An attempt will be made to 
disoover whether or not there appears to be any relationship be-
tween age, as indicated by grade placement between the third and 
eighth grades inclusively, and the ability to reason induotively, 
or make discoveries. 
The instrument to be used is a number-series test in 
which it is necessary to examine groups of numbers, discover the 
appropriate governing rule and complete the series with the next 
proper numbers. Although designed to measure induction, or the 
ability to discover rules, it is apparent that whether or not 
these rules have been accurately abstracted can be determined 
only when they are reapplied and the series either correctly or 
1. Spearman, e., and Jones, L. Wynn, Human Ability. London: 
1951, page 65. 
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incorrectly continued. It will be necessary therefore to rely 
on deduction for measurement and the question might well be 
raised whether the results to be obtained can be applied to the 
inductive process alone or should in fact be ascribed to general 
reasoning, involving both induction and deduction. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Before induction, or any In8nt131 process for th,et matter, 
oan be studied experimentally, it must first be capable of being 
isolated. In 1933, Charles I. Doyle, S.J. designed an original 
multiple choioe, self-reoording keyboard with which his 31 sub-
jects were required to cause a bell to ring in as few strokes as 
possible. When instructed to observe "scientific method," that 
is, alert observation, aocurate notes, and the distinction be-
tween hypothesis and observed faot, there was a significant im-
provement from the uninstructed performanoe. He conoluded that 
the instruoted performance was governed by thought, setting in-
ductive discovery apart from trial-and-error learning. 
On a more monumental scale, Thurstone and his associ-
ates in 1932 applied his method of factor analysis to a number 
of tests supposedly measuring intelligence. His now classical 
results suggested the isolation of eight factors, or primary 
mental abilities, among them induotive reasoning whioh he des-
cribed as the ability to solve logical problems, to foresee and 
to plan. This, he said, was the most important of all the 
primary mental abilities (PMA). When first published in test 
form some years later, after continued study, these PM! were 
reduced to six which still included a reasoning factor, thought 
to be inductive in nature and found in tasks requiring the sub-
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ject to discover the rule or principle governing the material of 
the test. To this day, a. reasoning subtest is still included in 
the two upper age levels of Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities 
Tests. 
In a rather complicated study in which he admitted a 
number of factors to have been uncontrolled, including the in-
trospection of untrained subjects, Burack investigated mental 
processes inherent in several kinds of reasoning, including in-
duction. He found induction to be characterized by 100% use of 
e. preliminary study of all aspects of the presented problem, 70% 
use of analysis into major variables, and only 40% use of clear 
formulation of the problem. He concluded that the number and 
kinds of methods used in solving reasoning problems depends on 
the kind of problem involved. Based, in part, on Burack's re-
sults, Olga McNemar tried to differentiate persons of high and 
low reasoning ability. Her study essentially confirmed Burack's 
results, as well as indicated that good reasoners might be 
characterized by superior processes and speed of induction. 
Even the most cursory review of literature on the 
isolation of inductive reasoning reveals an interesting, some-
times almost heated, and still continuing controversy between 
those advocating a number of distinctly separate but interacting 
abilities and the adherents of a single factor of general in-
telligence acting in all functions of human life. 
Charl~s Spearman, who had already suggested the exis-
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tence of a general factor of intelligenoe which he designated 
ltG," was one of the first to argue with Thurstone's multi-faotor 
theory. He denied the existence of any specific factor des-
cribed by any term as induction and insisted that any tests so 
named were in reality measuring fiG" or general intelligenoe. As 
might be expected, Thurstone retaliated by claiming that Spear-
man's tests for "G" were in truth inductive in nature. 
The Thurstones continued thsir attempts to further 
investigate the nature of the primary mental abilities and at 
the same time purify their tests by trying to reduce still 
further the number of primaries involved in each. By 1941 they 
said: ItThe inductive factor was again identified in the old and 
in the new tests that were specially constructed for this factor, 
but the tests for induotion did not have so high a validity as 
the tests for the more definitely identified factors. ltl They 
were nevertheless confident it did exist and that it deserved in-
clusion in their tests for PMA. Noting that induction obtained 
the highest correlation of all the primaries with their second-
order general factor, they tentatively suggested it might be the 
Itmuch-debated" general-intellective factor of Spearman. Further 
in the same study they urged that the l1inductive factor needs 
further study to clarify its nature. n2 By 1957 Thelma Thurstone, 
1. Thurstone, L. L. and Thelma G," Factorial Studies of Intelli-
gence, Psychometric Monographs No.2. Chicago: 1941, page 1. 
2. ~. page 27 
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reviewing their almost 20-year work on the PMA, identified the 
presence of two reasoning factors, induction and deduction. 
She said they could not be measured entirely separately no matter 
how hard it had been tried, as deduction was always necessarily 
present as a device to measure induction. She repeated the 
Reasoning factor's highest correlations with other factors and 
again suggested it may be Spearman's nG.t! 
Several studies have been done on the stability of the 
various PMA subscores. On the Induction test, Traxler obtained 
test-retest oorrelations of +.578 between the 9th and 10th 
grades, +.'731 between the lOth and 11th and..,. .758 between 11th 
and 12th. He generally concluded considerable but not exception-
al stability in the PMA over a year's time. 
Meyer and Bendig administered the Intermediate form of 
the PMA to 100 eighth graders and again as they were finishing 
eleventh. Correlations on R between these grades were i.76 for 
boys, +.71 for girls and +.75 combined or +.81, +.76 and +.81 
respectively when corrected for attenuation. He concluded a 
high degree of consistency among PMA between these grades. 
Since the controversey appeared, many factorial studies 
have been done on the nature of reasoning with varied results. 
Adkins and Lyerly obtained scores on 66 variables from 
200 Army men. They felt they failed to confirm a general 
reasoning factor but did identify five reasoning factors, three 
of whioh they thought to be inductive in character: 
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Factor At - Perception of Abstract Similarities, 
Factor B' - Hypothesis Verification, and 
Factor Mf - Concept Formation 
Using 21 test items, Corter extracted eight reasoning 
factors of which he identified all but one. His No.5, Concept, 
he felt was not too well established but appeared to involve re-
cognition, abstraction, generalization and inductive thinking. 
Matin and Adkins, in 1954, obtained inter-correlations 
among 13 first-order factors yielding six second-order factors. 
Their Factor IV, Speed in Analysis, included their first-order 
factors Number, Perception of Abstract Similarities, Perceptual 
Speed, and Space. They suggested that a fundamental ability 
common to all these factors was most plausible, probably an ana-
lytical ability. 
A side effect of a longitudinal study of the P~~ by 
Meyer and Bendig, already mentioned, revealed large correlations 
between factors suggesting to the authors ~~at tne structure of 
intelligenoe does not consist of independent traits but shares a 
common source of variation. 
Kettner, Guilford and Christensen oonducted a rather 
complicated series of stUdies designed to explore abilities con-
sidered important in the successful performance of high level 
p~rsonnel. The earlier of their studies suggested the existence 
of a general reasoning factor and later studies attempted to 
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olarify its nature ending in 1956 with a fl ••• oonoentrated 
study of a faotor that has been relatively e~sy to isolate and 
oross identify in faotor analytio studies but diffioult to de-
fine. ttl They used 23 tests designed to tap their three hypo-
thetioal definitions, ie, 1. Defining problems, 2. Handling 
oomplicated prooedures, and 3. Trial and error manipulation, as 
well as five reference faotors including eduction of patterns. 
Ten factors were isolated and nine identified, of which five 
were the reference factors. The remaining four included a 
mathematical achievement factor and one for eaoh of their three 
hypotheses. On the basis of these results and those of previous 
studies, the authors identified, by the process of elimination, 
their Factor F, Defining problems, as t~e best desoription of 
general reasoning-- It ••• has something to do with oomprehending 
or structuring problems in preparation for solving them. ft2 They 
urged further research to define the scope of this factor and 
suggested that general reasoning involves the gra9ping of ,at-
terns where conceptional relations are featured and that in this 
case it would parallel the factor eduction 2f patterns. 
Perhaps the most pertinent factor analytic study was 
done by Rlmoldi when he tried to investigate direotly the unitary 
na ture of Spearman' s na ft and its p03si ble rela tionshlps to 
1. Kettner, Norm.an; Guilford, J. P., and Christensen, Paul R., 
A Faotor-Analytic study of the Faotor Called General Reason-
ing: Educ. Psyohol. Measurement, 1956, 16, 438-453, page 449 
2. ~., page 449 
-20-
Thurstone's faotors I (Induotion), R (Reasoning) and D (Deduo-
tion). In all, he used 25 tests of "Gil, I, Rand D with 384 
children between the ages of 11 and 14. He extracted seven 
first-order faotors, including the eduction of relations (Spear-
man's second principle), the eduction of correlates (Spearman's 
third principle) and the eduction of likenese and its opposite, 
and three second-order factors. Theee three he described as: 
.CX Relation of likenees--basic step in solutions of 
intellectual problems 
~ Logical processes underlying intellectual activity, 
and 
1f Concrete psychological performances of synthesiz-
ing nature. He identified factor 0{ with "Gil as all high-loading 
tests involved Spearman's concept of noegenesis and abstraotion. 
Since all teste used were heavily loaded with Thurstone's I, R 
and D, however, he felt this to b~ sufficient grounds to believe 
them related to "aft and concluded that "an is non-unitary in 
nature. 
Factorizations in the course of Rimoldi's study sug-
gested that arithmetic ability involved functions other than the 
manipulation of numbers. Piaking up this aoncern in a Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Sister Mary Canisia Majewska attempted to explore the 
domain of mathematical ability in general and,in particular, 
study the nature of numerical and reasoning factors that seemed 
to enter into mathematical ability_ She administered 36 selected 
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tests to 150 eleventh grade girls. Twelve first-order factors 
were isolated including Factor J--which she identified as educ-
tion of correlates. High loading tests were those Spearman 
described as flG" and Thurstone as I or those in which " ••• the 
relationship is not given explicitly, but once it is discovered, 
the response may be the eduction of a correlate • ,.1 • • Among 
four second-order factors was Factor C' identified as probably 
representing abstraction and charaoterized by tasks which " ••• 
require ability to educe and manipulate relations of all kinds. tt2 
An interesting aspect of this controversey appeared 
when Wrigley, Saunders and Neuhaus compared the results of 
Thurstonets original work as analyzed acoording to a variety of 
factor analytical methods including their own Quartimax method, 
Thurstonets simple structure, Zimmermants revised structure, 
Holzinger and Harmon's bi-factor analysis and Eysenck's group 
factor analysis. The Inductive factor was isolated only by 
Thurstone who called it Induction and Zimmerman who called it 
General Reasoning. In the Quartimax method, the verbal factor 
merged with the general factor, lOSing its separate identity and 
becoming the General-Verbal factor. They concluded ItThe Quarti-
max results did not fully agree with either side in the oelebra-
ted dispute about the general factor but represent a midway 
1. Majewska, Sister Mary Canisia, C.S.F.N., A Study of Mathema-
tioal Ability As Related to Reasoning and Use of' Symbols, 
UnpublIshed Ph.D. DIssertatIon, Loyola UnIversIty, ChIcago, 
1960, page 40. 
2. ~., page 46 
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position. ttl The authors felt that further development of analy-
tic methods should eventually solve the controversy between pro-
tagonists of simple atructure and of the general factor. 
But whatever it is named, the ability to generalize 
from particulars to universals clearly does exist and it appears 
to be almost univeraally accepted that it is a developmental 
phenomenon becoming more fully defined and increasingly stable 
with age and maturation. 
Just about every book written in general or educational 
psychology or child development devotes at least brief and some-
times intensive consideration to the processes of reasoning and 
their maturation. Sully, back in 1915 and Fox in 1951 state 
that inductive reasoning, or discovery, begins naturally in the 
infant as he begins to make sense out of the vastness of the 
world around him. Gradually, through repeated observations, 
comparisons and groupings or classifications are formed which 
enable him to recognize and naru6 new objects and, eventually, 
ideas, because of his own past experiences. Younger children 
tend to expect too much similarity in things and may generalize 
from an inadequate range of observations. As experience widens 
and intelligence advances the points of diversity as well as 
uniformity are more clearly noted and more pains are taken to 
1. Wrigley, Charles; Sawnders, David R., and Neuhaus, Jack 0., 
A'9plication of the Quertimax Method of Rota tion to Thurstone's 
Primary Mental Abilities Study: Psychometrika: 1958, 23, 
151-170, page 155. 
limit conclusions. Fox says, nSinae It is more concrete, induc-
tive reasoning is often simpler' for a child, and in its elemen-
tary forms, such EtS the elimination of alternative hypotheses, 
is well within the competence of 9. child of eight years." l 
Vinacke, in his discussions of' children's abilities, 
their development and measurement, goes even further. He says, 
ItChildren, during the school years possess basically the same 
abilities which characterize older children and adults,ft making 
clear that he is n • •• not stating that children of all ages 
can do the same things, but rather tha t they oan do the S9.me 
kind of thing. n2 Whenever children of different ages have been 
investigated, it has been found that ability to deal with dif-
ferent kinds of tasks improves as the child gets older. This 
result occurs in all sorts of altus.tiona,,,:3 including reasoning. 
Rate of inorease varies, he says, in three ways: 1. Different 
children ahow different rates of increase in the same ability; 
2. Different abilities increase at different rates; 3. The same 
ability grows at different rates at different ages. Reasoning 
at six years, he says, is in the form of rather disorganized and 
subjective problem solving behavior with difficulty discovering 
and stating principles. By twelve, however, it seems much 
1. Fox, Charles, EduC8.ltiona:l Psychology. New York: 1951, page 346. 
2. Vinacke, W. Edgar, Intelligence Tests and Children's Abili-
ties, Education: 1957, 77, 421-4~6, page 424. 
3. Vinacke, W. Edg&r, Developmental Changes in Thinking, 
Education: 1957, 77, 318-322, page 319. 
easier to learn principles required to solve problems. Behavior 
is relatively ma~ure, organized and adapted to the requirements 
of the task. 
Piaget, in his numerous studies in the development of 
logical thinking theorized that thinking could be identified with 
verbal expression and differed by nature from one developmental 
stage to the next. Hazlitt took exception and postulated that 
children's thinking differed from adults by degree and not by 
nature. She found experimentally that abilities and verbaliza-
tions differed in matter of degrees with age and :1.ntelligence and 
that ability itself appeared before verbalization of it. She 
concluded there was " ••• no age limit in relation to the pro-
cesses of thinking, beyond that imposed by lack of experience.nl 
Heidbreder asked groups of three, four, six to ten year 
olds and adults to find a hidden object in a variety of simple to 
complex situations and explain how they knew where to look. n&mh 
quantititave and qualitative results indicate that the response 
of giving reasons is one which develops through the years; that 
there is an increase in the readiness with which it is elicited; 
that there is a progressive change in the forms it assumes; ••• 
that there is a growth or development • • • so often found in the 
development of othe.r complex organic processes. tl2 
1. Hazlitt, Victoria, Children's Thinking, British Journal of 
Psychology, 1930, 20, 354-360, page 360. 
2. Heidbreder, E. F., Reasons Used in Solving Problems, J. of 
Exp. Psych., 1927, 10, 397-414, page 411. 
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To test reasoning as opposed to learning in young chil-
dren from three to eight, Maier set up a maze situation in which 
it was necessary to build upon certain controlled experiences in 
the maze itself to reach a certain goal. He concluded that while 
the " •• • ability to re-organize past experiences to form new 
combinations is independent of the abl11r.y to form associations"l 
the lat·~er matures earlier and the ability to re-organize appears 
later, rarely under six. 
Osler and Fivel attempted to investigate the effect of 
age and intelligence on concept formation by induction. They 
asked subjects to find a hidden marble on the basis of matched 
pictures involving various concepts. They found no difference 
1n concept hierarchy but significant increasingly better perfor-
mances among the six, ten and fourteen year olds of their test 
population. 
Perhaps the single test used most extensively in the 
study of ability development patterns has been Thurstone's 
Primary Mental Abilities. In a pair of similarly designed stud~s 
on stability patterns of the PMA, Tyler administered tests at the 
first, fourth and eighth grade levels and Meyer at the eighth ane 
eleventh grade levels. Their pooled results indicate only chance 
relationships between test-retest soores at the first and fourth 
grade levels but between the fourth and eighth clear consistency 
for the Verbal, Number and Spatial factors but not for Reasoning, 
1. Maier, Norman, Reasoning in Children, Journal of Comearative 
Psychology, 1936, 21, 357-366, page 365. 
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which Tyler interpreted as being not yet unitary but representa-
tive of several separate reasoning factors. Meyer found a cor-
relation of 4.75 between eighth and eleventh grade R subtest 
scores. They concluded jointly that there is increasing stabili-
ty as well as differentiation of the various p~~ with age. 
Investigating sex differences among the PMA, Hobson 
found that eighth grade boys obtained a R subtest mean of 27.16 
and standard deviation of 8.49 while ninth graders a mean of 
29.65 and S. D. of 7.88. Eighth grade girls obtained a mean of 
30.44, S. D., 8.21 and ninth graders a mean of 32.98, S. D. 8.85. 
This indicated, he felt, that R increases in both boys and girls. 
Reasoning, specifically inductive reasoning, has been 
investigated and measured in a number of ways but the one that 
appears most often seems to be any variation of the number or 
letter series test. Numbers, sometimes letters, or both, are so 
arranged as to be governed or controlled by a general rule or 
principle. The required task is to examine the arrangement and 
from the specific clues derive, if possible, the appropriate 
rule, then re-applying the rule, complete the series with one, 
two or three numbers (or letters) usually at the end of the 
given series but very occasionally in the middle. 
Fox related the number series test directly to Spear-
man's third Principle of Cognition, the Eduction of Correlates. 
"Given the series, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, _, _, _, it is 
obvious that the relations between these fundaments is that of 
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geometrio progression, and, therefore the sucoeeding fundaments 
are determined."l Spearman himself was so impressed wi th the 
results of a.number series test in trying to discover Noegenetio 
tests to measure "a" that he suggested everything else be dropped 
and it used alone. 
At any rate, it seems to be almost a universal assump-
tion that induction oan be measured by number or letter series--
so much so that any study of reasoning, logioal thought proces-
ses or intelligence seems to include almost invariably at least 
one of these types. The faotorial studies mentioned earlier on 
the nature of intelligenoe or reasoning by Adkins and Lyerly, 
Kettner, Guilford and Christensen, Rimoldi, and Majewska all in-
oluded at least one form of these series oompletion tests, some-
times admittedly as reference tests for the reasoning or induo-
tion faotor. Buraok also used letter groupings as one of his 
specific tests for induction. 
Thurstone included number and letter series tests in 
his famous original study of the Primary Mental Abilities. They 
continued to appear a8 Induction or Reasoning tests in subsequent 
PMA test revisions and are still present in the eight - eleven 
and eleven to seventeen year old forms used today. The Kuhlmann-
Anderson Tests of intel11gence also contain an Induotion subtest 
including number series. 
Agnes Rogers was apparently the first to use number 
1. Fox, Charles, ~. Cit., page 284. 
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series in a sextet of tests designed to: 1. analyze numerical 
or symbolic data; 2. perceive the general rule implicit in them; 
3 •. apply the principles so derived. She used 12 n~~ber series, 
each consisting of four numbers with a blank space in the middle 
iu70lving the four common processes. Reliability coefficients 
for her two applications of this test to each of two schools 
were +.75 and +.70. Her Interpolation test included 40 items of 
varying lengths and degrees of difficulty. Items were groups of 
numbers with anywhere from two to ten empty spaces to be filled 
by some combination of addition. Reliability coefficients for 
this test were +.71 and •• 94. 
In 1917, the American Psychological Association appoin-
ted a committee headed by Robert Yerkes to set up the now famous 
Army Alpha and Beta tests to classify U. S. Army recruits and 
draftees in World War I. After considerable experimentation and 
revision by F. L. Wells and his associates, the Rogers' missing 
numbers tests became the Number Series Completion test, test 
#six of the Alpha form. The first revision of the examiner's 
guide listed coefficients of correlation of the seven other Alpha 
tests with Induction, or number series, ranging from +.61 to +.77 
and +.84 with the total test scoras. 
Investigating sex differences on Army Alpha scores at 
the secondary school level, Whipple reported that freshman boys 
and girls obtained median scores of 9.73 and 8.94 respectively 
while senior scores were boys, 10.80 and girls 9.92. 
Schneck administered nine tests to 210 college men, 
aged 18-21 to aBsesa measurement of verbal and numerical abilitia& 
Among his tests for numerical ability he included a 40-item num· 
ber series test, four taken from the Army Alpha and the rest his 
own design. The highest coeffecient of correlation for the num-
ber series test was with arithmetio reasoning and was +.920 Num~ 
ber series correlated +.48 with the whole numerical division of 
the battery. 
As part of a series of "Planning for Life" tests, G. B. 
Baldwin designed the Inductive Reasoning Test as a high school 
screening device for mathematics classes. It consists of a 40-
item, multiple choice number series test scaled and arranged in 
order of difficulty. Validity coefficients of correlation, ob-
tained between test scores and teachers' ratings, ranged between 
+.52 to +.85, averaging +.62. An odd-even reliability correla-
tion was +.93. The first 32 items were found to discriminate 
highly with high school freshnen and the last 32 with seniors. 
The first eight were so easy for seniors as to be virtually 
practice items and the last eight too difficult for most freshmen. 
The United States Employment Service (USES) test in-
cludes a number series 8ubtest which, in a study by Mouly and 
Robinson, comparing USES with PMA, obtained the highest correla-
tions of all with the Phil Reasoning subtest, + .65 for tenth 
graders and +.68 for twelfth graders. 
The Holzinger-Crowder Uni-Factor Tests were designed as 
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an ability battery for guida.nce purposes at the junior and senior 
high school levels. The R.eaaonlng subtest, R, making no attempt 
to <Ufferentiate induction and deduction, includes a mixed series 
(letters and numbers) test. Reliability coefficients on Rare 
reported to be for alternate forms (AM and 8M), +.827 and split. 
half, 4-.933. 
The Loyola Induction Study, a number series test, was 
conceived and devised in the late 1950's by Charles I. Doyle, 
S.J. of Loyola University, Chicago. Several studies have been 
done on it since. 
Mary McNeill included the Loyola Induction Study (LIS) 
in her battery of tests to investigate the relation between de-
duotive and inductive reasoning ability and adjustmeIlt in adults. 
Her population inoluded 100 bright junior and senior high school 
males mostly interested in science and 80 male and 20 female 
graduate and undergraduate university students mostly interested 
in industrial rela. tions. On the LIS the higb. sohool students 
obtained a mean score of 45.62 with a standard deviation of 9 0 22 
while the university students obtained a mean of 37.62 and stan-
dard deviation of 12.57. This difference was found to be signi-
ficant at the .01 level of confidence. She concluded that the 
higher high school mean represented an accelerated group of 
superior intelligerlce suggesting that inductive ability is close-
ly related to intelligence. 
A pair of similar studies compared performance on the 
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Loyola Induotion Study of junior and senior scienoe vs. humani-
ties majors in oollege. Ortolani studied 128, 64 in each group, 
Loyola University male students and Forst worked with 128 equally 
divided Mundelein College women students. 
The soience majors in Ortolani's study attained a mean 
of 44.5 arid standard deviation of 10.7 and the humanities a mean 
of 39.8 and standard deviation of 10.6. The differenoe in favor 
of the science majors was signifioant at the .02 level of confi-
denoe. When matched for intelligenoe, however, on the basis of 
ACE scores, the scienoe group's mean was 44.39, standard devia-
tion 9.7 and the humanities mean was 42.48, standard deviation 
10.2. This difference was not signifioant. When matohed on the 
basis of grade-point averages the science mean and standard de-
viation were 45.19 and 9.74 and the humanities were 38.09 and 
11.:3:3, the differenoe being significant at the .02 level of con-
fidence. He conoluded ir~uotive reasoning to be oharacteristic, 
but not exclusively so, of scienoe stUdents. Person~ with high 
induotive ability should be urged to enter science, he saId, 
while those with lower inductive ability should be guided into 
other fields. 
The yomen science students in Forst's study c~tained a 
mean of 43.59 and standard deviation of 10.41. Her humanities 
group scored 35.73 and 8.35 respectively and the dlffdrenoe be-
tween these groups was significant at the .001 levol of oonfi-
dence. LIS scores of the science group correlated +.726 with the 
Q and +.378 with the L subtests and +.592 with total scores of 
the ACE tests. Humanities correlations were ~.37l for Q, ~.394 
for L and ~.545 for total scores. Soholastio achievement as in-
dicated by gr~de-point averages correlated ~.3l7 for the science 
group, ~.473 for humanities and ~.49l for both groups together. 
Forst concluded that upper division Science students are superior 
to Humanities students on the LIS, also that there is a positive 
relation between performance on the LIS and scholastic ability 
as measured by ACE and that there appeared to be a high relation-
ship between Q ability on the ACE and inductive ability. 
In the most similar study to the one here undertaken, 
Sister Mary Colomana Buksa administered the original 42-item 
version of the Loyola Induction Study to 400 children between 
the fifth and eighth grades with the following results: 
GRADE MEAN 
5 
6 
7 
8 
13.34 
16.70 
18.98 
23.30 
DIFF. SIG. 
ST. DEV. AT, LEVEL OF CON'. 
-
7.44 ______ 
_____ .001 
5.91 ______ 
~.0Q 
8.04 ______ 
~ .001 
1.17 
)i:-She concluded simply that inductive reasoning devlops with age 
and maturation and can be measured reliably with the Loyola 
Induction Study. 
CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURE 
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The Loyola Induotion Study, having been lengthened by 
its creator, Rev. Charles I. Doyle, S.J., from its original 42 
items to 62 items and subsequently scaled and revised in order 
of increasing difficulty in unpublished work by the author, was 
administered to 1085 third to eighth grade pupils of 12 Chicago 
area public and parochial schools seleoted at random. Table 1 
includes these speoifio grade level populations. (For a oom-
plete listing of all oontributing sohools and grade-level break-
down, see Appendix C.) 
Table I 
Populations of Grade Levels Three Through Eight 
GRADE N GRADE N 
3 119 6 373 
4 179 7 376 
5 263 8 338 
The tests were administered in the regular classrooms, 
usually by the classroom teacher, sometimes by the principal or 
l~ 
teaoher in charge of the school's testing program. Eaoh was ~ 
10 
first instructed in the directions for administering this test'r 
in order to insure uniformity of test procedures. 
The test blanks {see copy in Appendixes A and B} were 
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distributed one to each student, name side up with instructions 
to do nothing until directed. After filling in name, school, 
grade and favorite subject information, attention was directed 
to the specific instructions and four samples on the front page. 
Each was read aloud followed by enough pause to permit the in-
dividual to record his answers, but no further help or correction 
was given. Students were then told to turn to the first full 
page of test items, to answ~r as many as possible, and that there 
would be a prize for the one having the most correct answers. 
Work was stopped and test blanks collected at the end of exactly 
20 minutes. 
The 82 items of ~ach individual test, including the 
four sample items, were checked for correctness of response. To 
be considered correct, it was necessary for all three blanks in 
a series to be properly answered. An individual score consisted 
of the number of series correctly answered. These individual 
scores were then tallied, or collated for each grade level. 
The mean, standard deviation and standard error of the 
mean were computed for each grade level using the following 
formulae: 
Mean: M=AO 
Standard deviation: 
-L 
+ N 
. 
is ~ N J N r.. d 2 - (~d)2 
Standard error of the mean: 
-35., 
Each grade level was then compared to its adjacent 
level by the oomputation of a standard error of difference using 
the formula: 
1. 
+ 
The significance of eaoh differenoe was then determined by ob-
taining the critical ratio, or t -soore by the formula: 
iVl, - I"'\k 
-\:, = 5"d ,+t 
and checking it against the table of significances in MoNemar's 
Psychological Statisticsl to see whether or not the null hypo-
thesis, in this case, "There is no difference in inductive rea-
soning ability as measured bl the Loyola Induotion Study from 
one grade level to the next,n might be accepted or rejected. 
1. McNemar, Quinn, Psyoholosical Statistics (2nd edition) 
New York: 1957. 
CHAPTER IV 
TEST RESULTS 
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The distribution of individual scores for es.ch grade 
level is presented in Table II, and in composite graphic form in 
l"igure :3. 
In Figure 3, some positive skewing is especially ap-
parent in the frequency curves for grade three, to a slightly 
lesser extent for grade four and is still somewhat noticeable 
at grade five. This suggests a tendency of low scores to bunch 
at these grade levels while the higher scores taper off more in 
accordance with normal distribution expectations. The curves 
for the sixth, seventh and eighth grades more closely approximate 
normal distribution patterns. 
Soores in the lowest interval, 0-2 correct, occurred 
at only two grade levels, the third with a fairly large number 
of eight, and one at the fifth grade level. The second interval, 
3 to 5 correct, contained, again, rather large scores of nine at 
the third, thirteen at the fourth and nine at the fifth grade 
levels. The reader is reminded that the four samples were in-
cluded in the scoring and that a score below four automatically 
indicates the failure of at least one of the sample items. 
It would appear that for the third and fourth grades, 
and to some extent the fifth, test items were in general too 
difficult to differentiate sharply among low scorers. It may be 
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Table II 
Distribution of Soores for Each Grade Level 
SCORE GRADE 
Intervals 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0-2 8 1 
3-5 9 13 9 4 1 2 
6-8 15 16 8 9 5 3 
9-11 15 15 10 13 6 3 
12-14 22 34 23 16 15 
15-17 21 30 48 51 30 7 
18-20 15 28 39 56 46 19 
21-23 9 23 42 59 48 20 
24-26 1 8 35 52 48 46 
27-29 2 6 20 47 58 48 
30-32 2 4 13 29 35 50 
33-35 2 9 17 43 43 
36-38 5 9 I 14 34 39-41 2 7 14 19 I i 
! 
42-44 1 
, 
! 7 13 
45-47 1 I 3 8 ! 
48-50 1 I 3 12 
51-53 1 I 7 
54-56 3 
57-59 1 
60-62 0 
Total 119 179 263 373 376 338 
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that number concepts had not yet been adequately developed among 
this group or perhaps this test needs the inclusion of items 
still easier. if possible, than those already present. Skewness 
might also result from the smaller size of the third and fourth 
grade samples in comparison to those of the other grade levels. 
That is. larger samples might more closely approximate the 
normal distribution. 
On the other hand, the literature seems generally 
agreed that while induction exists and functions within an in-
dividual since birth. the ability to deliberately isolate this 
process and apply it to a concrete situation or problem usually 
emerges samewhere after the age of six, and attains full maturity 
• 
about twelve. It seems quite possible, therefore, that these 
bunchings of low scores may include a rather high percentage of 
children in whom this ability to deliberately think inductively 
has not yet emerged or developed to the level where it can be 
of Significantly measurable practical use. 
At the upp~r end of the range of scores. only one 
grade level contained scores beyond the 51-53 correct interval. 
At the eighth grade level, three scores were obtained in the 
54-56 correct interval and one in the 57-59 correct interval. No 
scores were obtained in the 60-62 interval at any grade level 
indicating that this test waa difficult enough to discriminate 
well among even the moat proficient of the sample population. 
While too difficult for some. who may represent a 
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specialized group, this test was not too easy for any. With the 
possible exception of the low scorers in the third, fourth and 
perhaps fifth grade levels, the apparent approximation of the 
frequency distribution of the individual grade levels in this 
study to the normal curve, suggests that the results of these 
sample populations might be considered fairly representative 
of the general populations from which they were drawn. 
Table IV contains a concise tabulation of all the 
statistioal result s obtained from analyses of these data. 
Table IV 
Statioal Analyses of Data 
I ~ ARITH. D1FF. 
BETWEEN ST .ER. ST.ER.OF CR. SIG. 
G-RAI'E MFAN MEANS S.D. OF EEAN THE DIFF. RATIO LEVEL 
i 
3 12 .90 ""-. 6.59 
.600:::>-
/3.10 .788 3.93 .001 
4 16.00", 6.84 .511~ 
.,/ 3.59 '.675 5.32 .001 
5 19.59 > 7.15 .411>-3.07 .581 5.28 .001 
6 22.68 > 7.30 0378> 3.30 .531 6.21 .001 
7 25.96 > 8.26 .373~ 5.78 ____ -- .631 9.16 .001 
8 31.74 9.35 0509 
, 1 
The mean scores ranged from 12.90 for the third grade 
to 31.74 for the eighth grade with an almost even arithmetioal 
progression from the third to the seventh grades. (See Figure 5.) 
40 .. 
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Fig. 6. Means of Each Grade Level 
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GRADE 
The arithmetical difference between adjacent grades, three to 
seven, ranged from 3.07 to 3.69. There W8.S a much larger dif .. 
ference, however, between the seventh and eighth grades, namely, 
5.78. Somewhere between t he seventh and eighth grades, therefore, 
the ability to answer correctly number series problems seems to 
increase at a fester rete then €It other levels. 
It has already been mentioned that literature suggests 
that the ability to formulate and methodologically apply prin-
Ciples of inductive reasoning becomes relatively mature and well 
developed by about the age of twelve. Generally, this is the age 
span whioh covers the transition from seventh to eighth grades 
and may aocount, other than always possible sampling errors, for 
the apparent increase in development of reasoning ability at 
this level. 
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Standard deviations of each grade level (Table IV) 
consistently progressed from 6.59 for the third grade sample to 
9.35 for the eighth grade sample, indicating increasingly wider 
ranges of test scores for each higher grade level, as expected 
if more children would be able to solve increasingly difficult 
items trom one grade level to the next. 
The differences· between the mean scores from one grade 
level to the next, as expressed by their respective Critical 
Ratios, were all found to be signifioant at at least the .001 
level of confidenoe. That is, there is less than one chanoe in 
one thousand that each of these differences could have occurred 
by chance. 
The results of the present study are oompared with 
Buksa's 1960 results in Table VI. It must be remembered that 
her results were obtained on the original 42-item, empirioally 
soaled form of the Loyola Induction Study. In each oase, the 
means for her fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth grade population 
are oonsiderably below the means obtained in this present study 
(See Figure 7). In taot, they quite olosely approaoh the re-
speotive means tor the third, fourth, fifth and sixth grade 
levels of the present study. 
Table VI 
Tabular Comparison of Present Study With Buksa (1960) 
Present Study Buksa - 1960 
ARITH. SIG. ARITH. 
GRADE N h~EAN DIFF. Sl' .D. LI!."VEL N MEAN DIFF. 
3 119 12. eo , 6.59 > - --
>3.10 .001 
4 179 l6.CO> 6.84 > - --3.59 .001 
5 263 19.59> 7.15 > 100 13.34 > 3.07 .001 3.36 
6 373 22.66> 7.30 > 100 16.70 > 3.30 .001 2.28 
7 376 25.96> 8.26 > 100 18.98 > 5."18 .001 4.32 
8 338 31.74,_ 9 .~;5 100 23.30 I I , I 
SIG. 
ST.D. LEVEL 
-
-
7.44. > .001 
5.91 > 
.050 
8.04 > 
.001 
1.17 I 
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The differences between her fifth and sixth and seventh 
and eighth grades were, however, significant at the .001 level of 
confidence just as they are here. The arithmetical difference 
between her fifth and sixth grades is exceptionally close to that 
reported here but somewhat less for the sixth and seventh, and 
seventh and eighth grades. Interestingly, however, the amount 
of difference between each seventh and eighth grade group in-
creased similarly in each study beyond that which would have 
been expected from the more regular increases of the preceding 
grade levels. This observation adds some weight to the previous 
suggestion that there seems to be an increase, or "growth spurt" 
in the continuing development of reasoning ability at this level, 
resulting perhaps, from the acquirement of more mature, logical 
approaches to problem-solving situations Wlthin this age range. 
The lower means of Buksa's groups probably represent 
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limitations in the original test. The s~bsequent addition of 20 
items may well have provided inoreased souroes for success. The 
statistioally revised scaling in order of difficulty may be 
another important factor. During the work of revision iteself, 
it was discovered that a considerable number of items had been 
empirically misplaced. Thus, Bome harder items appeared fairly 
early in the test with relatively more easy ones appearing some-
what later. Getting "stumpedft on the early hard items may have 
prevented or seriously handicapped later success. It seems pos-
sible that this phenomenon oould account at least in part for the 
lowered significanoe (.05 level of oonfidenoe) Bukea obtained be-
tween her sixth and seventh grade levels which did not oocur in 
this present study and which she oould not explain other than 
possible sampling error. Going as far as these early hard items, 
students may have spent considerable time on them, virtually 
ignoring the rest, or perhaps, the failure on these affected 
later problem solving. The next level, however, suoceeding more 
easily on these early hard items may have been able to go on 
succeeding enabling the difference between these next levels to 
again be highly sign1ficant. 
Still another possible faotor in these differenoes in 
means between this present study and Buksa's, might be that ot 
motivation. Buksa's groups were asked simply to take parb in a 
study of how people make disooveries. The ~esent groups were 
promised a prize to the one in eaoh olass group achieving the 
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highest score, always a highly motivating influenoe, especially 
among essentially competitive grade-schoolers. 
Summary: 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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People from all fields of endeavor are raising pleas 
for the use of 'treason," that is, the observation of fects, the 
formulation of a hypothesis based on those facts B.nd the attempt 
to verify the hypothesis so deriveC!. Psychology, no less con-
carned about the use of reason, has also been concerned with the 
processes of reasoning itself. 
Philosophic tradition distingu1shes between two forms 
of reasoning: Deduotive, proceeding from the general law to the 
specific instanoe, and induotive, proceeding from a group of 
specific instances to a general law. 
It was with the hope of ttxploring the ability to reason, 
or think, inductively at various grade-school levels tl~t this 
present study was designed and conducted. The instrument used 
was the Loyola Induction Study, a number-saries completion test 
in which it is necessary to examine a group of numbers and ex-
tract from them the principle or law governing the arrangement 
of numbers before the series can be successfully completed. It 
was expected, on the basis of available literature and researoh 
studies in psyohology and education, that there would be a 
measurable increase in induotive reasoning ability, as measured 
by this test, from each grade level to the next. 
The Loyola Induction Study was administered to 1648 
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third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth grade students 
from twelve Chioago area public and parochial schools selected 
at random. The differences between the means obtained at each 
grade level were in every case significant at the .001 level of 
confidence. 
Conclusions: 
1. There appears to be a highly significant increase 
in the ability to reason inductively, as measured by this test, 
between each grade level, three through eight, inclusive. The 
question might well be raised as to whether the ability being 
measured is strictly inductive or, since it is necessary to 
re-apply each generalization in a deductive manner to test the 
appropriateness of the generalization, it might be better to 
name it general reasoning or equate it with general intellectual 
fUnctioning. Whatever it is precisely named, however, there is 
little doubt that this problem-solving ability becomes increas-
ingly well developed with age and maturation. 
2. The comparison of the results of the present study 
with those obtained in a similar study by Buksa in 1960 suggest 
the present lengthened and statistically soaled and revised form 
of the Loyola Induotion Study to be a more disoriminative, re-
liable and predictable instrument than its original form. 
3. The bunchings of low scores among the lower grades 
of this study suggest the test (LIS) may be too difficult to 
discriminate adequately among poorer performances at these lower 
-49-
levels. The validity of test scores below the third grade level 
might therefore be open to more serious question. 
4. There appears to be a sharper increase in problem 
solving ability between the seventh and eighth grades than be-
tween any other grade levels. As indicated by the literature, 
this is about the age when induotive methods in problem solving 
approaches become relatively mature and well-developed, they may 
at this time be able to be applied with somewhat greater success 
than expected on the basis of oontinuing development alone. 
5. SummariZing numbers 3 and 4 listed above, on the 
basis of this study, the ability to formulate and methodological-
ly apply deliberate problem solving processes appears to begin 
somewhere but not much before the third grade, and develops rather 
consistently through the years until it reaches maturity some-
where around the seventh or eighth grades. The increase in abili-
ty to reason which appears beyond the eighth grade and on into 
adulthood might therefore be considered to be more a factor ot 
increasing intellectual acuity, including the ability to grasp 
more abstract and complicated relations, as well as practice and 
refinement of the application of these problem solving processes 
than the continued development ot the process itself. These im-
plications may be extremely important to designers of tests to 
measure reasoning, especially when a single test is expected to 
serve both adults and children, as well as anyone attempting to 
establish age norms for this specific test (LIS)~ Much further 
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study of this apparent shift in the nature of increases in rea-
soning ability is needed before these implications should be 
seriously applied. 
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LOYOLA INDUCTION STUDY -- PAGES 1, 2 and 3 
LOYOLA INDUCTION STUDY 
Revised Edition 
Name, _____________ D.J.Jate, _____ _ 
StudentatL ____________________ _ 
Highest year of school completed (circle one) 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
What is your favorite study or your major field? 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is not an intelligence test. It is part of a study of how people 
make discoveries. 
There are some easy examples below. Please read each row of 
figures and then write in the three blank spaces at the end of each 
row the numbers that should follow. 
2 4 6 8 10 12 
9 8 7 6 5 4 
1 7 2 7 3 7 
2 2 3 3 4 4 
N.B. Please do not turn this page until you are told to do so. 
Copyright 1962, by Loyola University, Chicago 
APPENDIX B 
LOYOLA INDUCTION STUDY -- PAGE 4 
5 10 7 14 9 18 
9 18 13 26 17 34 
44 22 34 17 24 12 
23 22 20 17 16 14 
18 9 14 7 10 5 
14 7 12 6 10 5 
3 3 9 9 27 27 
1 3 2 9 3 27 
4 8 9 18 14 28 
4 16 26 5 25 35 
40 80 36 72 32 64 
1 1 2 4 3 9 
64 56 49 42 36 30 
74 64 8 59 49 7 
3 1 7 1 15 1 
144 36 100 25 64 16 
1 1 1 2 4 8 
64 72 56 8 36 42 
171 9 119 7 75 5 
13 17 19 23 29 31 
A2PENDIX C 
GRADE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION OF CON'rRIBUTING SCHOOLS 
Grade 
Grade School School N 'r'otal N 
,--."'''~.--''---.- f-" 
Three 119 
Marconi 47 
S~ t,,. u~._ .. ",~~"",,,,_,_,","" __ " __ 72 
Four 179 
St. Felicitas 43 
St. Thomns Mar' e ""." 'I.J •• ) ! 
Komensky 34 I 
st. _ Jo.&na. tius 
--.... ~-.----"-1--. 69 Five 263 
St. Michael 30 
st. Alphonsu8 34 
Smyser 47 
st. Thomas More 38 
St. Falicitas 47 I St~ Ia.natius 67 
'" Six I 373 st. Felicitas 45 
st. Alphonsus 35 I 
st. Thomas More 35 ! st. Micr.tael 18 
st. Sebastian 36 I 
Smyser 44 I 
st. Ignatius 77 ! 
st. Adrian 43 I 
st. Bride 40 I 
Seven I 376 st. Ignatius 45 ! 
St. Sebastian 52 ! 
St. Felicitas 46 
Memorial Jr. High School 23 
Smyser 52 
St. Michael 29 I 
St. Thomas More 31 I St. Adrian 50 
st. Bride 4B ! 
Eight 338 
st. Ignatius ! 57 
Smyser 41 
St. Felioitas 43 
Memorial Jr. High School 24 
St. Michael 36 
st. Sebastian 37 
St. Eride 48 
st. Adrian j 52 
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APPENDIX D 
D1stribut1on of Scor •• By Sohool • 
.. 
THIRD GRADE 
lr.l 
::s 
. .-\ 
...., 
C\1 
~ ~ ....... 
s::: ...... bO- O) 
o~ HOJ r-ir-i 
O"lJ4 ~ aSr-i 
~ ....... 
--
.p-
al ...., 0 Interval ~ rJ'J E--t 
0-2 7 1 8 
3-5 8 1 9 I 6-8 9 6 15 I 9-11 11 4: 15 I 12-14 7 15 ! 22 
15-17 5 16 I .21 I 18-20 15 115 21-23 9 ! 9 ! 
I 24-26 1 I 1 27-29 2 2 30-32 2 2 I 
33-35 ! 36-38 ! 39-41 I 
42-44 ! I I 
45-47 ! ! 
48-50 I 51-53 
64-56 
57-59 
69-62 
APPE.'NDIX E 
Distribution of Scores By Sohools 
FOURTH GRADE 
t---------r------,.---.-- ,.... .. _--"--" 
11.1 
GIS 
~ 
oM 
o 
...-I 
.-1-
fl)tt) 
P&:;~ 
-
• ~ 
11.1 oM 
~-I~- ~-! m 
.a tQ I 11.1 "If" tlO ()) t-
E-<tQ t:!tI) HtO .-1.-1 
- (\)- - GIS-
• · a·"" ~ "" 0 "" I 0 Interval ~ w ~ ~ 8 l---g-:-~--·-~·-8-i--l·~-r:- --l~-t 
6-8 2:3 9 2! 16 I ~2:i4 1~ ~ ~ i,I' 1! I ~: ! 
15-17 7 3 3 17! 30 I 
18-20 7 7 I 2 12! 28 I 
21. -23 3:3 ! 3 114 , 23 I 
24-26 - 2 2., 4!I,'. 8 l 
27-29 1 2 -! 3 6! 
30-32 2 1 - ill 4 I ! 33-35 - - I 
38-38 I, 
39-41 
42-44 I I 
45-47 " I 48-50 ' 
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51-53 II "---_:_~_:_:!_._J .. __ ....-+ __ +--_lJ. __ l-.... _________ ,
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APPENDIX F 
Distribution of Scores By Schools 
FIF'l'H GRADE I'-------..,...----r----- ------.----.--.---....---.-..----.--------1 
Q) 
H 
OJ 0 Ol 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
.-I 01 -\.l::;$ 
~ Q ~ ~ ~ 
CI1 0 CI:! 0 -\.l ~ ~ S ~ ~ -o~ ~~ - 0- .-1- Q- ~ 
..-l 0 .-I "Il\1 ~ t:- ~C: OJ I 1.0 l:'- 00 l:'- 1.0 
J 
~~ <~ ~~ ~~ ~~ HI.O .-I~ I 
~- I~- ~- ~-I~~-+~-I~-
Interval __ ~_. __ ~ \1l -'--~f~.--+~ _~,_E-i_-+-____ --ll 
0-2 I ! ! i 1 ill, 
3-5 I 1 I 3 2 I ! 31 9 
5-8 I ! 2 1 I 1 ! 2 2 I 8 
9-11 I 2 i 1 3 I I 3 1 i 10 
12-14 ! 5 ! 4 I 8 ! 3 'j 3 I I 23 ! 
15-17 ! 9 ! 7 I 7 I 6 8 I 10 I 48 1 ~~:~~ I ~ ! i ll~ I : I : I i~ I ~~ Iii' 
24-28 ; :3 II 5 II 5 ! 5 5 1171 i 35 
27-29 I 2 3 :3 I 4 1 j 20 
30-32! 1 I 2 I 2 1 i 7 I 13 I 
33-35 I 1 I I 2 2! 4 ! 9 i 
35-38 I ! 1:3 1 I!l 1 I 5 :1' 
39-41 i 1 II I 1 I 2 , 
42-44 I I I ,I,', I! 
45-47 I ! i 
48-50 I I i I I ~ !i~U .1_L ___ ' ____ ill._-'-I' ___ ---l 
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APP:&.1 ... DIX G 
Distribution of Scores By Schools 
SIXTH GrlADE 
____ "' __ "''''.' ____ 00_ r----
I 
I/) i M ! t1l I'll 0 Q 
lIS ;j :s lIS co 
+l (/J r-i ..... ;j 
..... ~ Ol !t' +' ..-! Q 
0 0 al lJ a:I +' lIS 4) ..... ,.t1 ,i:l 1.\1 lIS ..... ~ '0 
.-1- p.,- ! 0- 0- .0.- ~- ~-! ..-! - I.'i) 1DLf.) ...-ILf.) I..Q .. 'J ....; 00 Q;ltB M...qt bOt- 'Ci t'J i MOl:'-p:.~ <Kl 8t1) ~r-f t:I) I/)~ HI:'- <~! lXl~ir-i1.'i) 
- - I . - I 0 .......". - ftJ __ --- _i --- 1.\1-• . .. ~ • . ! • !.p Interval +l I~ l+l +l +l +l +l ~ +l I~ C1.) fI) " CIl V'J. V'J. I1.l CIl f I1.l 
-----I 
0-2 
I 
I I 
3-5 1 1 ! I 2 i 4 ! I 6-& 2 1 J 2 1 sa j 1 9 9-11 1 :3 1 j 2 1 2 1. I 2 13 I , ! i I 12-14 2 I 1 1 2 6 ! 3 1 ! 16 15-1'7 4 6 :3 5 6 6 i 6 10 I 5 51 i i 18-20 8 2 5 5 4 10 ill 4 , '7 56 , i ! 8 I 21-23 8 I 3 8 2 9 '7 9 I 5 59 
24-26 '7 I 5 5 1 '7 3 ! 17 5 I 2 52 , ! I 2'7-29 
" 
I 3 3 1 5 6 112 6 6 47 30-32 4 5 1 1 :3 ! '7 2 I 6 29 ! I i 33-35 
" 
I 3 2 , 4 1 :3 1'7 i I ( 36-38 ! 2 1 1 
i 
:3 1 ! 1 9 
I I I 39-41 1 1 2 2 1 7 42-44 I 1 1 
45-47 I 1 1 
48-50 ! 1 ! 1 , I ! 51-53 ! 1 I I 1 54-56 
I ! ' 
! I 
57-59 I 
I 60-62 ... __ .. L ___ ~ 
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APPENDIX H 
Distribution of Scores By Schools 
SEVENTH GRADE 
.-.. 4) 
t") ~ 
s::: In C\l 0 
i1! Qj a1 0- ~~ 
::I ..-l .J.) ~ .... ..-l .p ..-l • 4) III s::: 
~ 11.1 \') 'I:j Qj ~ ~ CD ~- ~ ..-l -IS::: ,:e: ..... 'd ....... .0- rl- mH --. t) --, 0- ~- '.-1- eo t:!Oll) CDC\} CD eo 0.-11 ~Ol • .-1 (j) .s:::r-f 'dO Hen ~ 
H<tt tf.)LO Ii. ';;;i M"Q CDLO ~C\l E-I "J <LiJ r.:t-tl .-It") 
-
......, 
'-" ~~ 1Il- '-'"' -' ....... -I CI:I-• • • ~ I~ • . • 1"0 ~ ~ ";-'1 <D~ ~ 4-> +' Interval CI) CfJ w. ~ rn CI) Cf.) Cf.) IE-! I 
I i I ! 0-2 I I 
I 
i 
3-5 1 I 
I 
I 
I i 1 I I , 6-8 I 2 2 1 I 5 ! j ! I ! 9-11 1 1 I 1 1 1 ! I 1 ! 6 I , 12-14 1 3 I 1 4 i I 2 2 ! 15 2 I ! I I 
! , 
! I ! 30 15-17 1 2 3 ! 1 13 2 J 1 I 6 1 I ! 
I 18-20 6 11 
! 7 
I 
9 4 I 1 4 4 ! 46 
I 
! I 21-23 5 
I 
7 5 2 
I 
5 5 ! 11 8 148 I I 24-26 6 4 6 10 , 3 ! 7 5 ? ' 48 ! I I I 27':"29 4 7 I 8 1 6 , 3 7 I 10 12 \ 58 
30-32 I 2 1 2 I 
, 
6 ! 6 135 8 I (5 i I I I 5 I i 1 43 33-35 8 ! 4 8 7 I 2 5 3 i 3 I ;3 36-38 2 I 7 i 1 2 
I 
1 ! 1 ! 14 i ! I 39-41 3 i I 2 3 ! 3 3 ! 1~ ! I i ! 42-44 1 I 2 I 1 2 
I 
I 1 46-47 I , 2 1 I 3 48-50 I 1 1 1 3 
51-53 I 
54-56 
57-59 
""'60-62 
I 
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APPENDIX I 
Distribution of Scores By Schools 
EIGHTH GRADE 
,-.,. 
'<1' 
O'l C\l ,::: 
:n ~ . ---- ro ::s ..p M rI ..-4 
-r-! ..-4 I-;) • Cl> +' ~ 
.J,.') 0 'd t'I$ O'l ~ crJ 
~-- ...-I riQ ~ In '0 ..-4 .-- rI- d;..; (.)- .D ---.. .....-1- ~- co bOt'-- ~rI (\)tt) ...-II ..-4!!) <Dt'-
'"'CO 'dOl t() t--l !.Q ~~ J:=..~ ~fn :,:~ !.'J c<) ti) (:Q~ ..... ,,.., d i:lJ .... ~~ ....., I/) --
-- - ---
....., 
--
11:1-
• ~ • a·"'" • . • . +' ..p .!..'\ O~ -+1 .p .p .p 0 
Interval CJJ DJ 0) ~ \I.l CJJ rI.l CJJ E-I 
--"-
--,-_. .. 
0-2 0 
3-5 2 2 
6-8 1 2 :3 
9-11 1 1 1 :3 
12 ... 14 0 
15-17 1 2 2 1 1 7 
18-20 2 :3 5 1 2 2 1 3 19 
21-23 1 3 4 1 2 3 4: 2 20 
24-26 2 12 4 3 4: 5 9 7 46 
27-29 4 5 5 4 4: 9 7 10 48 
30-32 10 5 5 4 4 8 7 7 50 
33-35 8 6 5 :3 3 5 6 7 43 
36-38 10 2 2 4 5 1 6 4 ~4 
39-41 8 2 2 3 3 1 10 
42";44 4 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 '2 
-v 
45-47 2 3 1 2 8 
48-50 1 2 2 1 6 12 
51-53 2 2 1 2 ,., 
54-56 1 1 1 ;; 
57-59 1 1 
60 .. 62 I 0 
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